NATO and that it will withdraw from the integrated military structure with the consequence that Allied forces and military headquarters must leave the country…" by the first of April, 1967 (NATO, 2012). France, ultimately however, did not carry through on its threat; but it is clear that, as a result of this early conflict, Anglo-Franc relations within NATO have always, and continue to be, strained.

Despite the claims made by the Republic of France, the United Kingdom, comparable to its European neighbor, encountered numerous issues in regards to discontent with the United States. Unlike France, however, these differences were, for the most part, ideological and not technocratic; and the disparities in ideology did not lead to an escalation comparable to the Franco-American one mentioned prior. One major ideological difference between the two Anglo-Saxon nations surrounded the question of weaponry; in particular, nuclear weapon implementation in warfare. On the issue of atomic weapons, the British have consistently favored non-proliferation, caution, and even the complete elimination of nuclear weapons (Foreign and Common Wealth Office of Great Britain, 2012). Today United States shares Great Britain's view in this regard; however, this was not always the case. According to Kaplan, during the preluding months of the Korean War, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee was greatly concerned that American President Harry Truman would employ atomic weapons against Korea. Prime Minister Attlee's apprehension towards the U.S. stance on nuclear-weapon usage was made even more evident when he felt compelled to take an emergency flight to Washington, D.C. to address the issue, speaking directly with President Truman himself (Kaplan, 27).

On top of the use of nuclear weaponry, British and American policy-makers have consistently disagreed on numerous issues in regards to ideological and technocratic alterations in NATOs military philosophy (Krauss, 36-37). Michael Lucas, in his book The Western Alliance after the INF, states that "NATO's official spending prescription had become a polite fiction." A fiction, inferred Lucas, which was promoted heavily by the United States, but subconsciously rejected by the British. Continuing, Lucas makes clear that, despite American wishes, by 1985, Great Britain had begun to drastically reduce its military budget and operations in Europe (Lucas, 55-57).

By the late 1980s, signs of impending Soviet failure were clear, and by the early 1990s the Cold War ended, made symbolically evident by the fall of the Soviet Union, and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Following these world-events, many predicted, as scholar Helene Sjursen points out in her article entitled "On the Identity of NATO," that the North Atlantic Treaty would lose purpose, and subsequently fade into the annals of history (Sjursen, 687). To the surprise of many academics NATO not only refused to decline, but grew in size and strength. According to Andrew Kydd in his article "Trust Building, Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement," many academics, including esteemed historian John Lewis Gaddis, first predicted that NATO would collapse upon itself following the close of the Cold War. Gaddis expressed first skepticism, and, then criticism of any NATO expansion—in membership or strength—in a post-Cold War world (Kydd, 802). Despite this, through much of the 1990s, former Soviet Republics in Eastern Europe, states in the Americas, as well as myriad nations within the Atlantic corridor gained acceptance into NATO (Kennedy, 1062-1063).

With the vacancy of the Soviet threat, as well as NATO's rapid growth in membership, academics point out that NATO's international ideology and policies were bound to a path-change. Kydd and Sjursen both reference the dramatic modification that NATO, as a result of the dynamic-conversion of the 1990s, was forced to take (Kydd, 804; Sjursen, 690). One of the most essential shifts occurred in regards to the military-operative philosophy of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty. This joint philosophy, per the Marshall Plan, was known as containment: a military rationale based upon the argument that as one state fell to communism, neighboring states were likely to follow suit. Consequently, containment, as its name infers, aimed to create barriers against communism in regions susceptible to collapse, and to halt the acquisition of any territory wished to be gained by Communists around the world (Kennedy, 959-960, 992; Saideman, 67-84). For obvious reasons, the end of the Cold War and an elimination of the "communist threat" were accompanied by the expiration of containment policy.

Another example of an operative change in NATO at the dawn of the modern era, was in regards to Eastern Europe. Once more, per