The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has a military and political ideology unique from all other individual nations, military coalitions, and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). A conventional military and political alliance on paper, NATO consistently promotes its civil interests (liberal-democracy) across the globe, while at the same time protecting the desires of the Western World. This natural, internal dogma of NATO is a direct result of the combined, deliberate, and in many cases, inadvertent influences of the three member states: the United States, the United Kingdom, and the French Republic. Through the evaluation and comparison of NATO's internal relations (focused upon the three prior mentioned states) during its early years and its modern foundations, it is easily recognizable that NATO's ideology is a mosaic of beliefs and actions developed through time.

Over the span of nearly sixty years, this collage of fluid, uncertain, and often contentious ideologies and interactions between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of France form the collective dogmata of NATO. As a result of the prior mentioned amalgamation, this IGO has a tradition of advocating peace and democracy, while pursuing its own individual interests through combined military force. This Western-based treaty organization is further distinguishable by the simple fact that it has been relatively successful in creating a strong union between member nations; and, unlike the former Warsaw Pact (WP), and other IGOs of the like, NATO has been extremely effective in achieving combined unity and success in most principle objectives.

In order to fully grasp NATO's ideology, it is pertinent to understand its core beginnings, and the means by which the organization became the alliance that the world knows it as today. At the close of the Second World War in 1945, it was clear that tensions between the Soviet-communist controlled Eastern corridor and the European-American dominated Western sector of Europe were bound to escalate (Kennedy, 928-929). European nations, including the United Kingdom and France, signed the Treaty of Brussels in 1948; and, after several months of recruitment, the two prior mentioned nations brought forth several signatories to this political and military alliance (Kennedy, 931-932). The United States, recognizing the importance of

such an alliance and the significance of a combined liberal-democratic front against Eastern communism, subsequently drafted (alongside the nations within the Treaty of Brussels) and signed the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 (NATO, 2012).

The North Atlantic Treaty, the founding document of NATO, was primarily authored by United States' foreign policy architects, in conjunction with advisories from the Republic of France and the United Kingdom (Kennedy, 928-929). From the beginning of the negotiations between the representatives of the United States, France, and Great Britain, discussion was bogged down by disputes in regards to differences in national-political ideology as well as technocratic variances; the most central of these issues existed between the Republic of France and the United States. As a result of the United States' reconstruction strategy for war-torn European nations (the Marshall Plan), as well as the personal benevolence of many foreign policy experts, the United States felt that West Germany's involvement in NATO was essential for success. France, as Lawrence Kaplan in his book The United States and NATO: The Formative Years points out, was not as fond: "Frenchmen [remembered] German behavior under the Nazis…and made it impossible for them to accept Germans as colleagues in a common effort [such as NATO]" (Kaplan, 24).

Franco-American discontent was heightened when the hegemonic power of the United States pushed unwaveringly past French resistance to include West Germany in the North Atlantic Treaty by 1951. With the dawn of the tensions of Korea in the early 1950s, the United States, through NATO, pushed for the rearmament of West Germany (Krauss, 107-108), a move not lost to the already malcontent French Government. To make these contentious matters even more precarious, the French Government, under President Charles de Gaul, claimed that a "special relationship" existed between the United Kingdom and the United States—an indirect result from the Middle Eastern conflict revolving around the Suez Canal—and demanded a tri-rule system of governance to eliminate this Anglo bias (NATO, 2012; Krauss 110-11; Kaplan, 24-27). France, following NATO's refusal to recognize de Gaul's request, threatened to remove itself from the alliance. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization states that "in 1966, France [announced] that it will no longer assign its forces to