the Marshall Plan, NATO had developed the ideology of exclusion towards the Eastern Bloc because NATO's primary rival, the Warsaw Pact, was comprised primarily of member states within this region (Sjursen, 689-691). However, with the elimination of the Soviet influenced Eastern Bloc, the philosophy of NATO changed from one of exclusivity to one of inclusion; membership was extended to the entirety of Europe, expanding the collective political ideology of NATO (Kydd, 805-807; Kennedy, 1062). As with all major power-players within a political-realm, change becomes necessary as situations, elements, and other variables are altered.

As a moral public servant, NATO altered its short-term objectives to conform to a changing world, but did not sacrifice its overall image and principled stature. And, while many of NATO's minor attributes were reformed following the end of the Cold War, much of its core ideology, as well as its underlying tension from within, remained. A primary example of this can be found in the caveats formed within the North Atlantic Treaty resulting from the Afghan War. According to the corporate British news company, The Guardian, in 2001 NATO, for the first time in its 50 year history, implemented article five of the North Atlantic Treaty: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them…shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them…will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking… such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area" (NATO, 2012; The Guardian).

As Stephen Saideman and David Auerswald point out in their article "Understanding the Sources of National Restrictions upon NATO's Mission in Afghanistan," the original mission in Afghanistan—Operation Enduring Freedom—was successfully spearheaded by the combined efforts of the United States, United Kingdom, and France. However, problems began to occur as early as 2003, and have since escalated, exposing the deeply engrained tension between the Anglo "partnership" and France (Saideman). The rift, moreover, caused by this conflict in the "graveyard of empires," transcends the Anglo-Franc rivalry. It also manufactured an attitude of complacency amongst member nations which made only made the Afghanistan conflict difficult to deal with, but created detrimental problems for future unitary efforts (Saideman; Layne).

Despite NATO's internal tension and inconsistency of policy between nations, both past and present, it has demonstrated itself as the most powerful amongst IGOs. Inter-State friction, as well as political, ideological, and military differences, have shaken NATO to its breaking point over the past 60 years. Yet, many hold that the very existence of NATO today, or its surprisingly common success in the past, would be impossible without the existence of the prior mentioned "negative" characteristics.

Christopher Layne, in his article "This Time It's Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana," makes clear that a large portion of NATOs historic success can be attributed to its lack of hegemonic rule (Layne). This conclusion can be easily seen by simply reviewing the issue of Franco-American discontent mentioned above: France, a relatively large and powerful state, was able to confront U.S. domination and challenge her. As a result, smaller and less significant players within NATO could, if so desired, join the "resistance," and work contrary to the U.S. or British goals (Layne; Kaplan, 24). Unlike the Warsaw Pact, and similar IGOs such as the African Union, NATO (despite modern assumptions) had/has no singular nation that could make decisions unilaterally, without the consent of other member states; hence, disenfranchisement is rare, and cooperation is high.

Kaplan, utilizing comparable logic to Layne nearly thirty years prior, comes to a complementary conclusion in regards to NATO's contentious nature. The disposition of NATO (one of tension and in-fighting) was essential, and it can be inferred that it is still today, to the longevity of the aforementioned IGO (Kaplan, 27). Furthering his opinion over the importance of the politically heated membership of the North Atlantic Treaty, Kaplan claims that "it has not been American coercion that explains its survival thirty-five years [as of 1984] after its inception," nor the existence of an external threat. Rather, continues Kaplan, it was the ability of the Western World to come together and create "European partners" to combat the demoralization (communism and discontentment) of Europe and maintain cooperative administration (Kaplan, 27-30). Because NATO was informally